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Abstract 
International migration has assumed significance in the policy discourse as a livelihood strategy 
adopted by households and individuals in Bangladesh. Migration whether within a country or 
across borders entails both costs and benefits. For migrants to make any significant strides in 
securing improvement in wellbeing, benefits accruing from migration should exceed the costs 
involved. This paper sought to provide assessment of the costs and benefits pertaining to 
international migration from Bangladesh to Italy. In this paper, we examine the role of migrant 
network in determining patterns of outmigration. Conditions under which migration equilibrium 
may permit multiple steady states are identified. The study employed data collected through 
questionnaire-survey and the data was analysed using cost-benefit formula. Our analysis discusses 
instances where migration generates its own demand and explains differences in migration 
propensities across potential sources of outmigration. The findings indicate that in real terms 
benefits outweigh the costs of migration. This means that there is economic justification for people 
to undertake out-migration. The paper, concludes that international migration is beneficial to those 
who embark on it as a livelihood strategy. Therefore, to reduce the positive and negative impacts 
of international migration and development to their equivalent money value Cost-Benefit Analysis 
determines whether on balance the migration is worthwhile. The equivalent money value is based 
upon information derived from migrants and labour market choices, the demand and supply 
schedules for labour affected by the movement.  
 
Keywords: migration, cost-benefit, determinants, equilibrium, propensities, Italy, 
Bangladesh
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cost-Benefit analysis (CBA) is a 
technique for evaluating a project or 
investment by comparing the economic 
benefits with the economic costs of the 
activity. However, this method has been 
applied in labour migration economics to 
determine the decision to migrate 
internally and also internationally. 
Determinants of the movements of people 
across national borders have been one of 
the central themes of recent research on 
labor migration. To this end, 
transnational migrant network is shown 
to play a significant role in the promotion 
of new and repeated migration. These 
networks are sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants and 
workers in the source country, 
interwoven within patterns of institutions 
such as the family, friendship, work 
relationships and shared community 
origin. In a series of studies pertaining to 
outmigration behavior of Mexican 
communities (Massey & Goldring 1992), 
the concept of social network is applied 
to account for differential migration 
propensities of otherwise similar locales 
(Mannan & Kozlov 1997). The key 
differentiating factor across these 
communities is attributed to the timing of 
the first trips abroad by pioneering 
migrants. The success of these pioneers in 
turn renders outmigration a feasible 
option for the set of non-migrants to 
which the pioneers are linked through a 
variety of social ties. Various other 
studies also confirm that undocumented 
migrants in particular, are able to secure 
their footholds in the host countries 
primarily through family and work ties 
established through prior contacts 
(Mannan & Krueger 2000; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes & Borocz 
1989; Gregory 1986; Taylor 1986; de 
Janvry & Mines 1982; Lomnitz 1977). 
The existence of such networks may 
facilitate migrant flows through the 
reduction in expenses involved in the 
initial stages of settlement, assistance in 
job search, as well as alleviating the 
psychological toll of leaving friends and 
family behind (Mannan & Krueger 
1998). 
It is therefore possible for a member of 
the network to be sent away to work in a 
location which is characterised by better 
economic climate to provide some sort of 
social insurance for the extended family 
CBA analysis is simply rational decision-
making. People use it every day, and it is 
older than written history. Our natural 
grasp of costs and benefits is sometimes 
inadequate, however, when the 
alternatives are complex or the data 
uncertain. Then we need formal 
techniques to keep our thinking clear, 
systematic and rational. These techniques 
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constitute a model for doing CBA 
analysis. It is important to keep in mind 
that techniques are only tools. They are 
not the essence. The essence is the clarity 
of the analyst understands of the options. 
Against economic instability and 
hardships at home. Despite mounting 
empirical evidence, attempts to 
incorporate the concept of migrant 
network in theoretical analysis of labor 
migration remain scanty. In this paper, 
we shall explore the cost-saving aspect of 
migrant networks and accordingly 
characterize the resulting pattern of 
migration in a dynamic setting (Rees 
1966; Montgomery 1991).  
The theoretical framework constructed in 
this paper discusses instances where 
migration generates its own demand and 
explains differences in international 
migration propensities across potential 
sources of outmigration. We distinguish 
between the stock and flow concepts of 
migration and emphasize the relationship 
between the stock of migrants in the 
destination country and the cost of 
migration for subsequent chains of 
migrant flows. To keep our analysis 
simple we postulate a world with perfect 
capital and labor markets with no 
institutional constraints on voluntary 
labor migration. We wish to underscore 
this set of assumptions, since as a matter 
of fact, contemporary migration from less 
developed to developed countries are 
seldom free and the presence of credit 
market imperfection necessarily 
constrains voluntary labor movements. 
Including elements of market 
imperfections in our model may, 
however, suggest that freeing markets 
from restrictive practices is a feasible 
policy option. To demonstrate the 
contrary, we shall show that even in such 
a flawless world, equilibrium migration 
may nevertheless be inefficient. 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE 
PROBLEM 
The concepts poverty reduction and 
migration and development have for all 
time been consistent. At the same time as 
international migration has received more 
attention in modern debates on migration, 
internal migration is far more significant 
in terms of the numbers of people 
involved and perhaps even the quantum 
of remittances that the people send home 
and the potential that it offers for poverty 
reduction, development, yet it does not 
attract much attention from policy-
makers and governments. In addition, 
there must be winners and losers in the 
international migration debate in terms of 
economic growth and development for 
Bangladesh. This study intends to find 
solution to the problem of cost-benefit 
analysis of international migration, 
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poverty reduction and development in 
Bangladesh. 
Even when the measurements of costs 
and benefits of international migration 
and development are complete, they 
might not speak for themselves until they 
are put in a framework. CBA analysis 
provides that framework. It can be used 
wherever a decision is needed and is not 
limited to any particular academic 
discipline, such as economics or 
sociology, or to any particular field of 
public or private endeavour. It is a 
mixture of several techniques from the 
management, financial and social 
sciences fields. 
Regardless of the aim, all CBA analyses 
have several properties in common. A 
CBA begins with a problem to be solved. 
For example, a community may have the 
goal of alleviating poverty and promoting 
development through migration in an 
area. Various activities that might solve 
the particular problem are then identified. 
As an example, alternative activity to 
alleviate poverty in an area might include 
an internal migration and development. 
The costs and benefits of these activities 
would be identified, calculated, and 
compared. Decisions are typically not 
made solely on the basis of CBA, but 
CBA is useful and sometimes required by 
law. Without a doubt, results from a CBA 
can be used to raise the level of public 
debate surrounding international 
migration. 
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The human capital model of migration 
proposed by Sjaastad (1962) regards 
migration as a type of investment which 
pays off if the present value of expected 
income outstrip the total costs likely to be 
incurred. The proponent also argues that, 
potential migrants undertake assessment 
of costs and benefits prior to the decision 
to move or not to move. For example, 
Shaw (1974) maintains that ability of 
potential migrants to conduct 
computations associated with costs-
benefits analysis (CBA) is subject to their 
awareness of job opportunities existing at 
the potential destination. The factors 
which play critical roles in this include 
migration experience, level of education, 
occupation, etc. These, to some extent 
expose the migrant to sources of 
information and therefore, play crucial 
role in the costs-benefits analysis. This 
paper employed the human capital model 
of migration as its theoretical framework. 
Following this, the costs-benefits model 
of migration was propounded on the basis 
of push and pull theory (Lee, 1966). 
Thus, migrants as rationale human beings 
perform assessment of what they need to 
give up (costs) against what they are 
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likely to gain if they embark on 
migration. Thus, the theory is based on 
the assumption that, a potential migrant 
will migrate, if the present value of future 
monetary benefits exceeds the costs 
involved (Sjaastad 1962; Hadley 1977; 
Spaere 1977). In sum, the main gain 
accruing to migrants is income 
differential between the place of origin 
and destination while the only monetary 
cost incurred is travelling expenses. 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Throughout the world, migration is being 
employed as livelihood and income-
earning diversification strategy either 
within or across borders. There is 
evidence from research that poor 
households in developing countries use 
migration in order to cope with relative 
deprivation (Stark & Taylor 1989). 
Migration decision can be made by 
individuals, families or an extended 
family network. In contrast to individual 
migrants, the decision of family migrants 
is only partly driven by their own social 
and economic considerations, and the 
opportunities and restrictions of all 
family members tend to influence such 
decisions. Thus it might not be sufficient 
to examine only individual motivations to 
understand migration decisions. It might 
even be that such decisions to migrate 
may have been proposed by the extended 
family and other similar networks. 
Migration for work either on temporary 
or permanent basis, is seen by many as a 
mechanism for improving the social and 
economic wellbeing. It is asserted that 
whether migration is motivated by push 
and pull factors (Lee 1966), expected 
income differentials (Todaro 1969; 
Harris & Todaro 1970) or income risk 
reduction (Stark & Levhari 1982), the key 
driving force for migration is the desire to 
improve the standards of living. In order 
to make this aspiration a reality, some 
people migrate and pursue livelihood 
activities in another locality (Mannan & 
Kozlov 1999). This enables them to earn 
income which can be used to acquire 
assets or send remittances (cash or kind) 
to support their household members left 
behind enhance their lives (Apt et al 
1992). Since migration is a worthwhile 
undertaking only when its monetary 
benefits in real terms are more than the 
costs incurred. The costs associated with 
migration include transport fares, use of 
savings or acquisition of loan with or 
without interest to meet living expenses 
before securing job and earning income. 
Besides, there are nonmonetary costs 
associated with this venture. For 
example, some migrants face stressful 
conditions such as poor accommodation 
or lack of decent shelter, joblessness, 
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poor working conditions, etc. at their 
destination (Mannan & Krueger 1996; 
Mannan & Kozlov 1995). 
This paper is intended to find out the net 
benefits derived from the international 
migration with the view to finding out 
prospects and or limitations of this human 
endevour. Specifically, the paper seeks 
to: Identify the level of motivation to 
migrate among the respondents; and 
Analyze the costs and benefits associated 
with international migration as a 
livelihood strategy. With this 
background, the paper examines costs 
and benefits of international migration 
with the view to determine whether it is 
detrimental or beneficial to international 
migrants.  
3.1 MODELLING 
3.1.1 The Micro Modelling 
The comprehensive migration flows 
represent the outcome of the underlying 
individual decision-making process. 
Modeling migration as a human 
behaviour is, therefore, a complementary 
more than an alternative approach. 
Rational individuals maximise their 
expected utility function, as a result, the 
decision of whether to migrate or not 
depends on the cost-benefit computation. 
The maximising behaviour was first 
addressed by Hicks (1932) who argued 
that “differences in net economic 
advantages are the main causes of 
migration”. Sjaastad (1962) developed a 
micro model where migration decision is 
modeled as an investment in human 
capital, heterogeneity among individuals 
is also emphasized. A large part of the 
migration literature evolved following 
the work of Sjaastad (1962). The 
migration decision in the interregional 
migration context is represented by the 
following expression: 
 
 
where Pu is the employment rate in the 
urban sector, namely, the probability to 
earn the wage Wu, the term c denotes the 
migration costs and wr is the wage in the 
rural sector. In contrast with the classical 
two sectors model (Lewis 1954) Harris-
Todaro model does not assume full 
employment. More generally, a higher 
wage in a different place may not be 
enough to encourage migration if it is not 
coupled with a low unemployment rate.   
However, a key question that the Harris-
Todaro model was not able to answer is 
why, even when the condition in (2) is 
satisfied, only some individuals migrate 
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while others do not. The assumption that 
only the expected income is important 
and the consequent omission of any other 
form of influence appears very 
restrictive. In this sense, the migration 
literature evolved merging the Harris-
Todaro expected utility maximisation 
approach with the human capital model, 
(Sjaastad, 1962) in order to account for 
the role of personal characteristics. 
In fact, at the same Todaro (1980) pointed 
out, migrants ‘tend to be 
disproportionately young, better 
educated, less risk averse’. Different 
surveys in migration research emphasis 
the important role of personal 
characteristics in migration research 
(Greenwood 1975, 1985; Cadwallader 
1992). Another significant development 
in the migration behavioural literature 
points to the observed unit, which is the 
decision maker. Mincer (1978) argues 
that migration decisions are taken by 
families rather than by the single 
individual. Later on, Stark and Bloom 
(1985) present the ‘new economics of 
labour migration’. The making-decision 
process of migration involves groups of 
individuals with different preferences.  
Moreover, the collective decision-
making not only maximizes the expected 
income but also minimizes risks related 
to different market imperfections. A 
recent development in micro theory 
model is the dynamic approach of 
networks models (Carrington et al 1996; 
Bauer & Zimmermann 1995, 1997).The 
idea is that migrants create networks in 
the destination places, which reduce the 
migration costs for new migrants and 
therefore favour future migration. In 
essence, micro modeling theory 
emphasizes the role of heterogeneity of 
migrants, that is, the human capital 
aspect, and the complexity underlying the 
decision-making process. 
3.1.2 The Origin and Destination 
Setup 
Consider a discrete time two region 
setting, respectively the origin and the 
destination. The home region is endowed 
with a stock of in-elastically supplied 
labor normalized to unity. At any time T, 
let the share of home country workers 
who are employed in the Destination be 
DT, employment at home guarantees a per 
period wage E(1- DT), where, by full 
employment, 1- DT, t is just the share of 
home country workers who are employed 
domestically. The foreign host country 
pays as per period wage E*(DT). E*(.) and 
E (.) are taken to be continuously 
differentiable with E*! (.) ≤ 0 and E! (.) ≤ 
0.  
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 The preferences of workers over income 
sequences {pT+t}tα=0 at any time T is 
given 
PT = ∑αT = 0 µT+t pT+t  
At the beginning of each period, a worker 
has two options. He can remain in the 
home country and receive the domestic 
wage. Otherwise, he may migrate abroad. 
Individual workers differ only in terms of 
their propensity to migrate (A) which 
takes on any value between 0 and 1. The 
proportion of workers in this economy 
endowed with an A≤Á is f (Á). F (.) is 
therefore a cumulative distribution 
function which has both its range and 
domain as the closed unit interval with an 
associated density function F(.) is strictly 
positive. 
3.1.3 The Cost of migration 
Migration involves cost such cost of 
migration may be due to the physical cost 
of transportation and the initial 
expenditure needed for settlement in the 
host country. Other perceived costs of 
migration may well be purely 
psychological such as the toll of leaving 
friends and families behind. In view of 
these considerations and to incorporate 
the cost reducing aspect of migrant 
networks, we shall denote the cost of 
migration at time t for any individual 
worker with migration propensity A from 
the home to the destination as K (A, DT-1) 
+ K 0 where DT-1 1 measures the stock 
of migrant in the foreign region in the 
previous period. The cost function K (. , 
.) exhibits the following properties (a1)  
K (. , .) 0  0 for all A, DT-1, (a2)  K (. , 
.) is taken to be continuously 
differentiable, increasing in A and 
decreasing in DT-1. 
As such, the cost of migration, can be 
perceived as composed of a fixed and a 
variable component. The first component 
Ƙ, which may be interpreted as the 
physical cost of migration, is constant and 
equal aross individuals. Condition (a1) 
requires that the variable component of 
the cost of migration be positive and 
condition (a2) requires that the cost of 
migration is decreasing in the stock of 
migrants in the destination DT-1. Finally, 
everything else equal, a worker with a 
higher value of a faces a higher cost of 
migration. These individuals are 
therefore followers in adopting migration 
as an income augmenting innovation. 
Those with low values of A, on the other 
hand are leaders, and as we shall 
elaborate below, with a given level of net 
benefit offered to potential migrants, 
individuals with low A’s always initiate 
migration flows. Finally, the cost of 
return migration is taken to involve only 
the physical cost of migration Ƙ. 
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Denote the expected lifetime utility of a 
worker in the home and the foreign region 
at any time T as 
PLT(A,DT-1) and PFT(A,DT-1) respectively,  
we have, 
PLT (A,DT-1)=OT (maxi{E (DT)+µ PLT+1 (A,DT),E*(DT)+µPFT+1 (A,DT)–Ƙ–K (A,DT-1)}׀ 
DT-1)……………(3) 
 
PFT (A, DT-1) = OT (maxi { {E (DT) + µ PLT+1 (A, DT), E*( DT) – Ƙ, E*( DT) + µ PFT+1 (A, DT) 
Where OT is the expectation operator. 
Migration in this framework depends, 
therefore, not only on the income 
sequences of the two regions, but also the 
stock of migrants in the foreign region as 
well as the way in which the expectation 
of future income flows is formed. In this 
section, we shall impose two assumptions 
which allows us to completely 
characterize the relationship between PLT 
and PFT and thus the dynamics of 
migration which ensue:  
 
(a3)OT (DT ׀ DT-1) = DT-1,(a4) E*(DT)–E(DT)–Ƙ > 0 for any DT 
Condition (a3), which requires that 
expectations be static, captures the notion 
that each individual takes the observed 
foreign wage and the stock of established 
migrants as given at the time of 
migration. Condition (a4) accounts for 
the fact that the home region (a village, 
for instance) is sufficiently small 
compared to the destination, so that the 
wage equalization across these two 
regions does not occur whatever be the 
degree of outmigration from the origin 
region. 
With these assumptions the lifetime 
income of a home and a foreign worker at 
any time T can be simplified as  
 
PLT (A,DT-1) = maxi [{1 / 1-µ} E (DT-1)},{1 / 1-µ} E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K(A,DT-1)}]………..(4) 
 
PFT (A,DT-1) = maxi [{1 / 1-µ}E(DT-1)}–Ƙ,{1 / 1-µ} E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K (A,DT-1)}] 
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Equation (3) depicts three possible 
relationships PLT and PFT. Curve PP 
depicts the income differential across the 
home and the foreign region net of the 
physical cost of migration. Curve KK, on 
the other hand, denotes the variable 
component of the cost of migration as a 
function of the extent of outmigration. 
Note in particular that from assumption 
a2, both PP and KK are downward 
sloping. Equation 3a depicts the situation 
where the network effect dominates, 
namely, that the reduction in migration 
cost as migration progresses is always 
greater than the concurrent reduction in 
income differential. In this particular 
case, migration is not feasible for all 
values of D < Ď and thereafter, the 
benefits of migration is strictly higher 
than the physical and the variable costs of 
migration combined. 
Equation 1b depicts the opposite scenario 
where the incentive reduction effect 
dominates as the KK curve is strictly 
flatter than the PP curve.  In this case, 
migration is feasible for all values of D < 
Ď although thereafter, the benefits of 
migration no longer induce outmigration 
from the source country. Finally, 
equation 1c depicts the intermediate 
scenario where the network effect 
dominates for small values of D and this 
effect is overtaken by the incentive 
reduction effect as migration proceeds. 
As we shall elaborate in the sequel, each 
of these cases represents benchmark 
situations which has an important bearing 
on the dynamics of migration. 
To see this, note that migration from the 
home to the foreign region takes place at 
time T if, for some a and a given stock of 
previous migrants, 
 
(1 / 1-µ)E(DT-1)–{(1 / 1-µ)E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K(A, DT-1)} ≤ 0. 
By assumption (a2), the monotonic relationship between A and the cost of migration 
guarantees that for all Á < A, 
(1 / 1-µ)E(DT-1)–{(1 / 1-µ)E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K(Á,DT-1)} ≤ 0. 
Finally, denote the propensity to migrate of a marginal migrant A (DT-1) as follows: 
 
(1 / 1-µ)E(DT-1)–{(1 / 1-µ)E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K{A,(DT-1),DT-1} ≤ 0. 
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Accordingly, the degree of outmigration 
at any time T given DT-1 can be written as: 
ET = maxi [f{a(DT-1)},DT-1)] 
Where {a(DT-1)}=min [{A(DT-1)}1].   
The law of motion of the dynamic process 
of migration consists of two elements. 
First, since the expected income 
differential across the two regions at any 
time T depends on the stock of previous 
migrants both through the cost reduction 
effects of migrant network and the role it 
plays on the expectation of future income 
flows, f {A (DT-1)} is accordingly the 
measure of origin country workers with a 
propensity to migrate which is at least as 
high as the marginal migrant. In addition, 
since DT-1 is itself determined by the 
degree of outmigration at time T – 2, 
equation (5) depicts a cumulative process 
of migration in such a way that each act 
of migration on the part of home country 
workers induces a chain of subsequent 
outmigration, which is otherwise 
impossible had the pioneers remained in 
the village. 
Secondly, while the marginal migrant is 
just indifferent between migration or 
staying put at the time of migration, the 
same may no longer hold once migration 
at time T is completed. Namely, 
 
(1 / 1-µ)E(DT-1)–{(1 / 1-µ)E*(DT-1)}-Ƙ–K{A,(DT-1),DT}
 may be of either positive or negative 
sign. Since migration cost is a one-time 
payment at the time of migration, we 
obtain, by invoking (a4), the second term 
of equation (4) which requires that the 
measure of migrants at any time T be no 
less than that in the previous period 
irrespective of the degree of 
outmigration.  It follows 
straightforwardly that a migration 
equilibrium Ď is a rest point to equation 
(5) with Ď  f {a (Ď)}. 
With this in mind, a simple application of 
fixed point theorem gives the following 
proportion:  
If f{a(.)} is continuous, a migration 
equilibrium…….(i) 
A migration equilibrium D* is locally 
stable if and only if  
f{a(Ď)}  Ď and F {a(Ď)}δ(D*) <1 …………………(6) 
                                 where δ(D*) = [E(D*)+E*׀(1–D*)–(1-µ)KD{a(D*),D*}] 
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Equation (2) graphically depicts the 
dynamic process of migration as in 
equation (5). The horizontal and the 
vertical axis respectively denote the 
degree of outmigration at time T – 1 and 
T. The 450 line is the set of all possible 
steady state solutions to equation (5). The slope curve DD on equation 2a is given by: 
(dDT  / d DT-1) ׀ DD = F{a(DT-1)}δ(DT-1)if F{a(DT-1 )} (DT-1 )……………(7) 
Accordingly, curve DD is respectively 
upward and downward sloping 
depending precisely on whether the 
network effect or the incentive reduction 
effect dominates. Furthermore, the 
frequency distribution F(.) also affects 
the slope of the dd curve in that the 
smaller the frequency of individuals for 
any particular value of a (DT-1 ) and thus 
the smaller the density of the marginal 
migrant, the flatter the dd curve. Finally, 
the larger the discount rate, the flatter the 
dd curve. 
Let us begin with the case where the 
network effect dominate. One such 
scenario is depicted in equation 2a. As 
shown, the dd is always upward sloping 
and in this particular scenario, it 
intersects the 450 line twice. There is a 
continuum of steady states for all initial 
rates of outmigration where D0 ≤ D* with 
D0 = D*.  That this should be the case is 
due to the fact that voluntary migration 
cannot take place prior to the point D*. 
Any exogenously determined initial rates 
of outmigration which satisfy this 
criterion is itself a steady state due to the 
migration decision calculus described 
above. D* is an equilibrium migration 
threshold whereby for any initial rates of 
outmigration greater than D*, migration 
takes on its own momentum as network 
externality gives rise to sufficient 
reductions in the cost of migration for 
subsequent rounds of migrants. 
Voluntary migration will proceed until 
the stable equilibrium D** is reached.  
In fact, it can be shown that if the 
migration equilibrium nearest to the 
origin is locally unstable and that the 
same condition guaranteeing instability is 
satisfied for any D between zero and D*, 
there exists a Ď with 0 <  Ď < D* such that 
a (Ď) =0. Put another way, the existence 
of a migration equilibrium D* with 
strictly positive rate of outmigration, does 
not necessarily imply that for all levels of 
outmigration less than D*, migration is a 
feasible option. Notice that starting from 
a point like D = 0, equilibrium is one 
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where no migration takes place at all. In 
other words, outmigration becomes 
feasible only when the stock of 
established migrants exceeds a threshold 
level. Migration then perpetuates due to 
equation (5) since the cost saving role of 
migrant networks outweighs the 
reduction in net benefits as migration 
proceeds. The pattern of migration, 
therefore depends crucially on initial 
conditions. 
Our previous discussions on employer 
recruitment as well as those immigration 
policies which encourage the reunion of 
families and relatives thus play an active 
role in determining these initial 
conditions. As a result, even in those 
circumstances where wages and income 
are similar in potential source 
communities, the pattern of outmigration 
may turn out to be drastically different. A 
contrasting situation is depicted in figure 
2b. That curve dd is downward sloping 
for all values of DT-1 is a result of the fact 
that the incentive reduction effect 
dominates and hence, δ (.) ≤ 0.  Note in 
particular that the 450 line and the dd 
curve may intersect once only (at D*) and 
thus for all initial rates of outmigration D0 
≤ D*, f {A (D0)}  D*.  As the dd curve 
is downward sloping, f {A (D0)} is a 
stable steady state. In fact, it can be easily 
confirmed by figure 2b that the type of 
chain migration described figure 2a 
simply does not occur and we are back to 
the neoclassical world where any 
incentive to migrate from the home to the 
foreign country is wiped out within one 
period in a situation where network 
externality is insignificant. Finally, figure 
2c illustrates the third case where the 
relative dominance of network and 
incentive reduction effect varies over the 
course of migration. Migration 
equilibrium may be stable or unstable 
depending once again on the initial stock 
of migrants from the origin. 
The multiplicity of equilibria is possible, 
precisely due to the favorable 
externalities engendered by the stock of 
established migrants in the foreign 
country. Everything else constant, each 
act of migration generates a chain of 
further movements of labor in ways that 
spread migration within the source 
community. Nevertheless, when 
migration decisions are based on cost-
benefit calculations undertaken by the 
individual worker, the potential gain to 
the source community at large will not be 
internalized when each agent maximizes 
his / her lifetime utility. Migrant 
networks, therefore, exhibit a public good 
property. The next section is thus devoted 
to study the welfare implications of 
migrant networks. 
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3.1.4 The Migration Welfare 
Modelling 
Consider a social planner who may 
choose an optimal path of outmigration in 
order to maximize discounted societal 
welfare of the home region. The planner’s 
problem is thus 
 
maxi ∑αT-1 [µ E*{f (At)}f (At)]+E{1–f (At)}{1–f(at)}-ꭍAt {Ƙ+K(A,f (At - 1)F(A)dA}..(8) 
         {A}αT-1                                                                                                                     T-1 
                                                                                               
subject to At  0. Denoting the optimal path as {Át }αT-1, it follows that:  
E{f (ÁT)}+ E{f (ÁT)}f(ÁT)+µ{Ƙ + K{ÁT,f (ÁT)}-ꭍ ÁT-1{Ƙ+K(A,f (At - 1) F(A) dA}=                          
E{1–f(ÁT)}+É{1–f(ÁT)}{1–f(ÁT)}+[Ƙ+K{ÁT ,f(ÁT-1)}]………………..(9) 
Along the optimal path of migration, ÁT 
equalizes the marginal benefits and costs 
of migration where the marginal benefits 
should take into account the change in 
foreign wage as well as the reduction in 
the cost of migration as a result of an 
incremental increase in the outmigration 
rate. The marginal cost of migration, on 
the other hand, should take into account 
the change in the home income as a result 
of outmigration as well as any increase in 
the cost of migration as workers with 
higher A migrates. 
That this socially optimal path may not 
coincide with the competitive outcome 
should be clear by comparing equation 
(4) and (6). In particular, since at any time 
T, voluntary migration takes place until 
 
E*(Dt-1)–(1-µ)[Ƙ+K{A(Dt-1), (Dt-1)]} = E{1-(Dt-1)}, 
which states that migration equalizes the 
expected lifetime income across the two 
destinations for the marginal migrant. 
The deviation of this privately optimal 
rule of migration and equation (9) 
depends on the rate at which domestic 
and foreign wages change in response to 
migration flows, as well as the size of the 
network effect KD ( . , . ). Ceteris paribus, 
the larger the network effect, the larger 
will be the deviation of voluntary 
migration from the social optimum. The 
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source of the sub-optimality of voluntary 
migration, is two-fold. Social optimum 
entails migration decision making in the 
form of marginal as opposed to average 
income comparisons. Finally, the socially 
optimal rate of outmigration also take 
into account the network externality that 
each act of migration engenders. It can 
also be confirmed straightforwardly that 
if this source village is a ‘price-taker’ in 
the domestic as well as the foreign labor 
market and if network externality is 
absent, the privately optimal degree of 
outmigration coincides with the socially 
optimal one. 
4.1 DATA 
This paper is based on a study of 
Bangladeshi migrants in Italy. A semi-
structured questionnaire covering bio-
data, motivation, costs and benefits 
related to migration. The questionnaire 
was administered through interview. 
Owing to inability to obtain sampling 
frame for international migrants in Italy, 
a purposive sampling technique was 
adopted. In view of this, migrants from 
rural Bangladesh who were available and 
willing to participate in the survey were 
interviewed. Snowball approach was 
adopted to reach the target group in the 
selected regions. The data collected was 
processed with Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (Version 16). 
Quantitative techniques were used to 
analyze the data. The unit of analysis is 
the individual migrant from rural 
Bangladesh. The need to capture costs 
and benefits in monetary terms was taken 
into account during the formulation of 
questionnaire. The study used descriptive 
statistics to analyse the data collected. In 
addition, cross-tabulation between some 
variables and background characteristics 
of the respondents was carried out. 
Finally, a costs-benefits model was 
employed to determine extent to which 
somebody in rural Bangladesh will 
benefit from migration in Italy. 
Mathematically, the migration decision 
model for international migration 
between Bangladesh and Italy is 
represented by the above models. 
The CBA technique is considered as a 
good method for comparing competing 
alternatives. It is scientific approach 
usually used in examination of the worth 
of investments or utilization of natural 
resources. Thus, CBA can be employed 
to carry out assessment of migration 
decisions. In this paper, CBA was used to 
assess the potential decision on migration 
from one country to another country for 
the purpose of enhancing the welfare of 
the migrants; and by extension their 
households at either the place of origin or 
destination. However, the use of CBA 
technique is not without shortcomings. 
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First, the CBA approach is done by 
allocating monetary values to all 
identified benefit and cost variables. In 
view of the fact that, there are always 
intangible variables; it is extremely hard 
to assign monetary values. In addition, 
the outcome of the entire exercise 
depends on the discount rate used by the 
researcher. This has made some 
observers to conclude that CBA 
technique could be less objective. It 
should also be noted that CBA approach 
is carried out on the basis of existing 
information, so the whole operation is 
limited by the knowledge on benefits and 
costs available to the researcher(s) 
conducting it. 
4.2 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The ages of the respondents in the study 
ranged from 18 to 66 years with the 
majority of them being persons below 40 
years. The respondents who were aged 
less than 30 years formed 38.5 percent 
while 29.3 percent and 32.3 percent were 
31-40 years and above 45 years 
respectively. With respect to of 
educational attainment, the results of the 
data analysis indicate that some of them 
(7.80%) had graduated and very little 
(1.03%) post-graduated level of 
education. It was also found that 51.20 
per cent and 23.67 per cent of them 
indicated that they had attained higher 
secondary and secondary levels 
respectively. It was found that few 
migrants in the study (4.07%) did not 
have formal education. 
Table 1.1: Level of Educational 
Attainment  
Level of Education Percentage 
No any formal 
education 
4.07 
Primary level 12.23 
Secondary level 23.67 
Higher secondary level 51.20 
Graduate level 7.80 
Post-graduation level 1.03 
Total (%) 100% 
 
It was found that 12 percent of the 
migrants increased their level of 
education during migration, and males 
formed majority. In terms of their marital 
status, it was found that majority of them 
were married (67.5%) and the remaining 
32.5 percent of the respondents indicated 
that they had never married. 
Analysis of the period within which the 
respondents had been in migration 
revealed that, they had been away for two 
to over 18 years. It was found that, three 
out of every five out-migrants (55%) had 
been away for two - five years. It also 
emerged that 20 per cent and 25 per cent 
of them had been in migration for 11 - 18 
years and over 18 years respectively. It 
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was found that even though they are 
permanent migrants they undertake 
periodic visits to their communities of 
origin. 
The study ascertained the level of 
motivation to migrate based on the 
benefits from migration among the 
respondents. The motivation to migrate 
was measured on Likett scale (strongly 
agreed, agreed, indifferent, disagreed and 
strongly disagreed). The results showed 
that majority of them (75%) were in 
agreement that they were motivated to 
migrate. On the other hand, 15 percent of 
them disagreed that they were motivated 
by the likely gains of migration to travel. 
The remaining 10 percent of the 
respondents indicated that their decision 
to migrate was not based on the benefits 
to be accrued (indifferent on motivation 
to migrate). 
This analysis shows that all the 
respondents indicated their sectors of 
employment at the place of destination. 
However, only two out of every three 
respondents (67.6%) were employed 
prior to their migration from Bangladesh. 
Thus, one-third of the migrants indicated 
that they were not gainfully employed 
prior to their migration from the origin. 
Disaggregation of the migrants who were 
employed prior to migration. However, 
all of them respondents indicated that 
they were employed at their destinations. 
There was comparatively high proportion 
of the respondents engaged in trading or 
retail sector than agriculture. The others 
included domestic workers, security, 
cleaners, gardeners, etc. Table 1.2 
presents the employment sectors in which 
migrants were engaged at the destination 
country. The relatively low proportion of 
respondents employed in the agriculture-
related activities could be explained by 
the fact that the study was undertaken in 
urban and peri-urban localities in the 
selected regions. The disaggregation of 
the level of motivation of the respondents 
in terms of employment prior to 
migration revealed that it was higher 
among those without employment 
(67.2%) than those engaged at the place 
of origin (61.5%). However, there was no 
variation among those who indicated 
indifference to motivation, whether they 
were engaged prior to migration or not. 
The analysis of differences in income 
obtained between the place of origin and 
destination was based on only those who 
were employed prior to migration 
migrants (67.6%). A total of 39 
respondents who were employed prior to 
their departure from their places of origin 
did not provide information on income 
differentials. They indicated that, they 
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earned between USD$50.0 and 
USD$1000 above what they were 
receiving at their places of origin and 
none of them indicated a decline in 
earning.  
With regard to the cost of movement 
(migration), a total of 321 out of the 350 
respondents provided data for analysis. 
The cost of migration ranged from USD$ 
6,000 to USD$ 13,000 with an average of 
USD$ 9500. Employing the average extra 
income earned at the destination and 
migration costs (nominal) as inputs for 
the costs-benefits analysis, it was 
revealed that migrants gained net 
benefits. The adjusted income and 
expenditure for the minimum period of 
migration (two years) were USD$ 36,000 
and USD$ 9500 respectively. This means 
that the benefits received far outweighed 
the costs incurred by a migrant to move 
from Bangladesh to Italy. In other words, 
the total net benefits accruing from 
migration in real monetary terms was 
USD$ 26, 500. The results showed that 
more than three out of every five 
respondents were influenced by what 
they were likely to gain. This means that 
majority of the migrants assessed the 
gains that would accrue to them prior to 
their departure as predicted (Sjaastad, 
1962; Hadley, 1977; Spaere, 1977).   
The migration costs borne by migrants 
negatively affects the decision to migrate 
(see Table 1.2). In view of this, 
excessively high migration cost could 
deter prospective migrants from 
embarking on their migration trips. Thus, 
to some extent a relatively higher 
migration costs (long distance between 
the place of origin and destination) could 
discourage some would-be migrants. The 
employment status prior to migration 
represents both monetary and 
nonmonetary benefit accruing from out-
migration. The relatively high average 
monthly earning of the respondents 
(differential) could be explained by the 
fact that the sample had an exceptionally 
high proportion of persons with higher 
educational attainment. This accounted 
for the lower percentage of respondents 
who were engaged in agriculture-related 
fields. Considering the employment 
sectors of the respondents is not strange 
that they earn relatively higher incomes. 
This is based on the fact that most of the 
time respondents consider such data as 
sensitive and are therefore not willing to 
provide accurate information on their 
earnings. In view of this, they tend to 
understate income and overstate 
expenditure. 
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Table 1.2: Fixed and marginal costs of migration, by year 
Descriptions  Year 
Pooled 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Bilateral travel time -8.24 -14.6 -5.68 -4.67 -7.00 
 (0.20) (16.6) (2.03) (1.74) (3.07) 
Fixed cost of migrating -3.14 -1.87 -3.23 -3.34 -3.52 
 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.20 
Bilateral distance -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Value of living in state of birth 1.35 1.20 1.33 1.38 1.16 
 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.05 
Mean migration rate 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Mean bilateral distance migrated 568.4 544.7 601.2 583.8 576.0 
Mean traveltime migrated 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Generally, the expected differences in 
income between two places should be 
significant in order to compensate those 
who embark on migration since there is 
positive relationship between change in 
income and the migration decision. Thus, 
if a rationale being perceives that a 
change in region of residence could result 
in a rise in his or her nominal earning, it 
is likely to have positive influence on the 
decision to move, all other factors 
remaining the same. On the basis of the 
finding that almost two out of every five 
migrants were unemployed prior to 
migration but became gainfully 
employed (destination), movement was 
beneficial. From the analysis, the net 
benefits from migration is positive, this 
means that all things being equal, a 
prospective migrant will be motivated to 
leave the place of the origin as postulated 
by some authors (Todaro 1969; Harris & 
Todaro 1970). Thus, it confirms the view 
that an individual is influenced to migrate 
to a location deemed to have economic 
opportunities to facilitate improvement in 
his or her standards of living. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the monetary 
benefits play a significant role in the 
decision to migrate. This does not 
however, mean that the non-monetary 
costs are of less relevance. 
 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
Mannan, K.A., & Kazlov, V.V. (2001). The Cost-Benefit Analysis of International Migration: Modelling and Empirical Study between 
Bangladesh and Italy 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
In order to reduce the positive and 
negative impacts of international 
migration and development to their 
equivalent money value Cost-Benefit 
Analysis determines whether on balance 
the migration is worthwhile. The 
equivalent money value is based upon 
information derived from migrants and 
labour market choices, the demand and 
supply schedules for labour affected by 
the movement. Care must be taken to 
properly allow for such things as 
inflation. When all this has been 
considered a worthwhile migration is one 
for which the discounted value of the 
benefits exceeds the discounted value of 
the costs, the net benefits are positive.  
The findings revealed that motivation to 
migrate is significantly high among the 
respondents particularly, those who were 
unemployed prior to migration. It 
emerged that income earning 
opportunities available at the destination 
communities serve as the pull factor for 
prospective migrants. This enables them 
to get employment and earn higher 
wages, save part and invest. However, 
this depends on the type of skills 
possessed by the people involved and 
livelihood opportunities available. 
Consequently, they will be able to remit 
their households left behind and thereby 
contribute to improvement in their 
standards of living. Following from this, 
the study concludes that a prospective 
international migrant is rational and 
conducts CBA prior to migration. 
To summarize, we have singled out an 
example where international migration 
propensities may differ even if the 
domestic wages are identical throughout 
the source country. Conditions under 
which migration may be suboptimal from 
the source communities’ point of view 
are identified. These conclusions are 
drawn by postulating that the cost of 
migration is endogenously determined by 
the degree of outmigration itself, and in 
addition, the stock of experienced 
migrants pertaining to a particular region 
is a parameter specific to each region. In 
the case where the cost-saving role of 
migrant networks dominates, we identify 
a threshold level of migration such that 
once the number of experienced migrants 
exceeds this level, voluntary movements 
of labor, which is otherwise an infeasible 
endeavor, commence and perpetuates. 
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